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Flagged at the Border
“ARMED AND DANGEROUS.”1 Imagine those words flashing on
a Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”) agent’s computer screen as
you attempt to reenter your country of birth from a relaxing vacation.2
Reacting to the computerized warning, the CBP agents detain and
question you for several hours before you are released from custody—
without an explanation—and allowed to continue on your trip home as
if nothing had happened.3
* Villanova University School of Law, J.D. Candidate 2013; University of Delaware, B.S. 2010.
Thanks are due to Professor Todd Aagaard for his helpful comments and editorial advice
throughout the writing process. This Article would not have been possible without the love
and unwavering support of the author’s family.
Shearson v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 638 F.3d 498, 499 (6th Cir. 2011) (flashing warning
on screen of customs agent when Julia Shearson’s passport was scanned).
2
See generally Robert L. Smith, Julia Shearson Tells How a Weekend Trip to Canada Became a
5-Year Fight for Rights, The Plain Dealer (June 4, 2011, 5:10 PM), http://blog.cleveland.com/
metro/2011/06/julia_shearson_tells_how_a_wee.html (providing details of Shearson’s vacation).
3
See Shearson, 638 F.3d at 499–500 (presenting similar scenario).
1
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This hypothetical scenario became very real for Julia Shearson and
her four-year old daughter in January 2006, and marked the beginning of her quest for answers.4 Why was she flagged as “ARMED AND
DANGEROUS?”5 What actions had she taken that led the government
to classify her in this way?6 Could she obtain documents held by the
Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) and CBP that might indicate
why she was detained?7 What recourse does she have to clear her name?8
In addition to Shearson’s concern about being misclassified, her
situation also raises several national policy questions.9 What effect
would mandatory disclosure requirements of an agency’s inner operations have on its ability to protect the United States from threats to
national security?10 Under what circumstances should a federal agency
that possesses sensitive information relating to national security be
allowed to exempt itself from the disclosure requirements?11
These questions highlight the broader issue of establishing equilibrium between personal privacy and national security in the twenty-first
century.12 The notion that people needed to sacrifice some individual
freedoms in return for the protection provided by organized society
was developed early on in political philosophy.13 But striking the
appropriate societal balance between personal liberties and security
has proven to be extremely difficult, and supporters for each have even

See id. at 499–506 (describing factual background of Shearson’s case).
See infra note 52 and accompanying text (discussing CBP’s claim that Shearson was flagged
because of false alert, and her skepticism over this explanation).
6
See infra notes 51–58 and accompanying text (offering potential reasons for Shearson’s
classification).
7
See infra notes 53–57 and accompanying text (describing Shearson’s attempts to obtain these
documents under provisions of Privacy Act).
8
See Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1974) (providing certain remedies against agency for
maintaining inaccurate information about individual).
9
See infra notes 139–41 and accompanying text (discussing over-arching policy concerns involved
with tension between individual privacy and national security).
10
See Smith, supra note 2 (explaining apprehension on part of government attorneys regarding
potential ramifications on national security of requiring agency to disclose information relating to
border stops).
11
See infra notes 134–38 and accompanying text (advocating in favor of permitting agencies to
utilize general exemptions provision to prevent disclosure of information that could negatively
impact national security).
12
See Jennifer Chandler, Privacy Versus National Security: Clarifying the Trade-off, in Lessons From
the Identity Trail: Anonymity, Privacy, and Identity in a Networked Society 121, 121 (Ian Kerr
et al. eds., 2009) (acknowledging tension between protecting individual freedoms and maintaining
national security in post-9/11 world).
13
See id. at 126 (describing lack of protection in “state of nature” and emergence of social contract
in which people voluntarily joined together to form societies and surrendered certain freedoms in
exchange for security and protection provided by organized group).
4
5
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taken to social media sites to advocate for their position.14 Congress
attempted to weigh these two competing considerations in its passage
of the Privacy Act of 1974 (“Privacy Act”), which regulated the type
of information a federal agency could maintain on an individual, but
provided agencies with exemptions from the disclosure requirements
for law enforcement activities.15 The United States has changed dramatically since the Privacy Act’s passage though, and several authors
have noted that society now tends to give security more weight than
personal liberties, especially after the events of September 11, 2001.16
This Article argues that the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
improperly held that Shearson may compel DHS and CBP—a law
enforcement branch of the DHS—to disclose documents relating to her
detainment under the Privacy Act, and asserts that congressional action
is required.17 Part II provides a general overview of the Privacy Act
and the factual background of Shearson’s case.18 Part III surveys other
circuit court cases that have wrestled with interpreting the extent of the
See id. at 127 (analyzing relationship between privacy and security). At one extreme, the
survival of societal members is paramount and privacy considerations are secondary, but
this could be taken so far that the secure life of those in the society is no longer worth living
because they enjoy no liberties, privacy, or other fundamental rights. See id. (noting that at other
extreme, if absolute privacy is viewed as most important factor, added privacy becomes useless
if resulting security level is so minimal that no members of society survive to enjoy it); see also
Personal Privacy, Facebook (Oct. 2, 2011, 11:36 AM), http://www.facebook.com/pages/Personalprivacy/108220189211921 (recognizing privacy as “right not to be subjected to unsanctioned
invasion of privacy by the government, corporations or individuals”); National Security, Facebook
(Oct. 2, 2011, 11:41 AM), http://www.facebook.com/pages/National-security/112812148732650
(listing use of “intelligence services to detect and defeat or avoid threats and espionage, and to
protect classified information” as potential measure to increase national security).
15
See generally Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1974) (providing individual privacy protection
and agency exemptions); see also infra notes 26–45 and accompanying text (discussing requirements
of Privacy Act, its structure, and its purpose).
16
See Conor Gearty, Reflections on Civil Liberties in an Age of Counterterrorism, 41 Osgoode Hall L.J.
185, 203 (2003) (describing security as “trump of trumps” when weighed against civil and political
rights); Peter P. Swire, Privacy and Information Sharing in the War on Terrorism, 51 Vill. L. Rev. 951,
955 (2006) (advocating for greater information sharing, and thus less individual privacy, in order to
prevent and preempt harm). Several potential reasons for the amount of weight society places on
security are: 1) that security is a prerequisite for enjoying other values such as privacy, 2) human
risk perception causes people to overestimate the risk of terrorism and underestimate the impact
of reduced privacy, and 3) that the burden of reduced privacy is unlikely to affect every member
of society equally, whereas the benefits of added security are enjoyed by society as a whole. See
Chandler, supra note 12, at 125–26. Indeed, according to a recent Gallup poll, a clear majority of
American citizens approve of sacrificing privacy for increased security. See Lymari Morales, Most
U.S. Air Travelers OK Sacrificing Privacy for Security, Gallup (Nov. 23, 2010), http://www.gallup.
com/poll/144920/air-travelers-sacrificing-privacy-security.aspx (reporting that seventy-one percent
of people polled indicated that potential loss of privacy from full-body scanners or pat-downs was
acceptable as method to prevent acts of terrorism).
17
See infra notes 101–07 and accompanying text (discussing how Sixth Circuit overlooked plain
language and structure of Privacy Act in favor of legislative history and purpose). Additionally,
the considerable policy implications regarding the national security of the United States weigh
against the Sixth Circuit’s decision. See infra notes 139–46 and accompanying text.
18
See infra notes 23–61 and accompanying text (providing discussion of purpose and structure of
Privacy Act, as well as background of Shearson’s case).
14
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permissible exemptions under the Privacy Act’s general exemptions
provision.19 Part IV of this Article details both parties’ positions and
summarizes why Shearson’s argument persuaded the Sixth Circuit.20
Part V critically analyzes the Sixth Circuit’s reasoning and suggests
that the court’s holding was improper in light of the Privacy Act’s plain
language and the likely effects of its decision on national security.21
Part VI explores the potential implications of the Sixth Circuit’s ruling on the future of personal privacy and the national security of the
United States.22
I. The Privacy Act to the Rescue
The Privacy Act guards against a federal agency’s abuse of an individual’s privacy by regulating the collection of documents that relate to
that person’s activities.23 In order to protect against unlimited information gathering by federal agencies, the Privacy Act attempts to restrain
federal agencies in their collection, maintenance, use, and dissemination of information about private individuals.24 The various provisions
and structure of the Privacy Act, however, evince Congress’s intent to
balance an individual’s right to privacy with the need to ensure that
federal agencies function effectively.25
A. Discerning the Privacy Act’s Purpose
The United States Constitution does not provide a general right
to privacy, and although Supreme Court precedent has established a
privacy right in certain situations, legislative action remains the main
avenue for protecting privacy.26 Congress passed the Privacy Act in
response to concerns about the amount of personal information that the
government gathered on its citizens and the way in which that sensitive
See infra notes 62–74 and accompanying text (detailing previous court decisions regarding
breadth of general exemptions provision).
20
See infra notes 78–107 and accompanying text (summarizing arguments made by each party and
stating Sixth Circuit’s holding).
21
See infra notes 108–30 and accompanying text (critiquing Sixth Circuit’s analysis).
22
See infra notes 131–46 and accompanying text (examining impact that Sixth Circuit’s decision
will likely have on national security).
23
See Gregory R. Firehock, The Increased Invulnerability of Incorrect Records Maintained by Law
Enforcement Agencies: Doe v. FBI, 60 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1509, 1510–11 (1991) (noting that Privacy
Act protects against abuse of privacy rights by federal government).
24
See id. at 1511 (discussing Privacy Act’s methods of safeguarding informational privacy rights).
25
See id. at 1512–13 (illustrating competing factors that Congress weighed in drafting Privacy Act).
26
See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (recognizing right to intimate, consensual sexual
conduct); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (stating that right to abortion is included within general
right to privacy); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (establishing right to sexual privacy
within marital relationship); see also Firehock, supra note 23, at 1545 n.6 (explaining that statutes,
not Constitution, regulate agency’s system of records).
19
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information was being handled.27 In fact, many people believe that
the well-publicized informational abuses that took place during the
infamous Watergate scandal prompted Congress to act.28
In the Privacy Act’s Congressional Findings and Statement of
Purpose section, Congress explicitly acknowledged the perils that
inappropriate use of personal information presents to individuals
in an increasingly technological age.29 The advent of computers and
developments in technology made storing and organizing massive
amounts of personal information in an agency’s system of records easier than ever before.30 In drafting the Privacy Act, however, Congress
balanced the need to protect individual privacy with the concern
that absolute informational rights may obstruct a federal agency’s

See Larie A. Doherty, Privacy Act, 56 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1028, 1028–29 (1987) (explaining that
Privacy Act was intended to prevent invasions of privacy resulting from federal agency misusing
personal information); Kirsten L. Peters, Freedom of Information Act/Privacy Act, 65 Geo. Wash. L.
Rev. 792, 793–94 (1997) (commenting that goal of Privacy Act was to calm apprehension about
extent of personal information kept by various federal agencies).
28
See Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579 (1974), reprinted in Joint Comm. on Gov’t
Operations, 94th Cong., Legislative History of the Privacy Act of 1974, at 4 (1976), available at
http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/LH_privacy_act-1974.pdf [hereinafter Legislative
History of the Privacy Act] (stating that Watergate scandal taught Americans that there
must be limits on what government can know about each citizen). “Each time we give up a bit
of information about ourselves to the Government, we give up some of our freedom. For the
more the Government or any institution knows about us, the more power it has over us.” See
id. (explaining that when government knows all of our secrets, “we stand naked before official
power” and lose our rights and privileges).
29
The Congressional Findings and Statement of Purpose, enacted as a part of the Privacy Act but
not codified, explain Congress’ concerns that led to passage of the Privacy Act:
(1) the privacy of an individual is directly affected by the collection, maintenance,
use, and dissemination of personal information by federal agencies;
(2) the increasing use of computers and sophisticated information technology,
while essential to the efficient operations of the government, has greatly magnified
the harm to individual privacy that can occur from any collection, maintenance,
use, or dissemination of personal information;
(3) the opportunities for an individual to secure employment, insurance, and
credit, and his right to due process, and other legal protections are endangered by
the misuse of certain information systems;
(4) the right to privacy is a personal and fundamental right protected by the
constitution of the United States; and
(5) in order to protect the privacy of individuals identified in information systems
maintained by federal agencies, it is necessary and proper for the Congress to
regulate the collection, maintenance, use, and dissemination of information by
such agencies.
Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579 § 2(a), 88 Stat. 1896, 1896 (1974).
30
See id. § 2(a)(2) (citing increased use of computers and sophisticated information technology
as magnifying harm to individual privacy); see also 5 U.S.C. § 552a(5) (1974) (defining “system
of records” as “group of any records under the control of any agency from which information
is retrieved by the name of the individual or by some identifying number, symbol, or other
identifying particular assigned to the individual”).
27
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ability to perform certain functions relating to law enforcement and
national security.31
B. The Privacy Act’s Complicated Structure
The Privacy Act is comprised of multiple sections, including provisions that regulate the disclosure and access to a system of records,
the civil and criminal remedies available to an aggrieved citizen, and
the possible exemptions available to an agency.32 Of particular importance to Shearson’s case are subsections (b), (d), (e), (g), (i), and (j).33
Subsection (b) regulates the conditions for disclosure of records by
an agency, and limits an agency’s ability to disseminate information
to certain scenarios.34 Agencies must account for these information
disclosures under subsection (c), which requires the date, nature, and
purpose of any disclosure, in addition to the name and address of the
person receiving the disclosure.35

See Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579 § 2(b)(5), 88 Stat. 1896 (1974) (stating that purpose
of Privacy Act is to provide safeguards for individuals from abuse of information by federal
agencies, but also recognizing need to permit agency exemptions from requirements in cases
where important public policy need for such exemption exists); see also Legislative History
of the Privacy Act, supra note 28, at 297 (noting need to balance fundamental and conflicting
needs of “individual American for a maximum degree of privacy over personal information he
furnishes his government, and on the other, that of the government for information about the
individual which it finds necessary to carry out its legitimate functions”). It also recognized that
the government has a right to collect certain information, and that exemptions need to be available
for agencies to protect information that is highly confidential. Id. at 296 (explaining legitimate
need of government to collect, store, use, and share certain types of personal data, in addition to
realizing that “certain areas of Federal records are of such a highly sensitive nature that they must
be exempted from some of its provisions”).
32
See generally § 552a (establishing certain controls on data use by federal agencies).
33
See id. (listing various provisions relating to collection, use, access, and potential exemptions
for data under Privacy Act).
34
The Privacy Act states, in relevant part, that “no agency shall disclose any record which is
contained in a system of records by any means of communication to any person, or to another
agency” except pursuant to a written request by the individual to whom the record pertains,
unless the disclosure would be:
(1) to those officers and employees of the agency which maintains records who
have a need for the record in the performance of their duties;
(2) required under section 552 of this title; . . .
(5) to a recipient who has provided the agency with advance adequate written
assurance that the record will be used solely as a statistical research or reporting
record . . . ;
(7) to another agency . . . ;
(9) to either house of Congress, or, to the extent of matter within its jurisdiction,
any committee or subcommittee thereof, any joint committee of Congress or
subcommittee of any such joint committee; . . .
(11) pursuant to the order of a court of competent jurisdiction.
Id. §§ 552a(b)(1)-(11).
35
See id. § 552a(c) (illustrating accounting requirements for disclosures under subsection (b) with
exception that no accounting is required for disclosures made under subsections (b)(1) and (b)(2)).
31
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Subsection (d) grants an individual the right to access her records
and to request an amendment of her records if she believes them to be
inaccurate, but also clearly indicates that individuals will not be allowed
to access information collected in reasonable anticipation of a civil action
against that person.36 The amount and type of information that an agency
can maintain on an individual is regulated by subsection (e).37 Subsection
(e)(7)—which requires that no agency maintain a record pertaining to an
individual’s exercise of her First Amendment rights unless that record
is pertinent to law enforcement activity—is particularly relevant to
Shearson’s case.38
The Privacy Act also has two enforcement provisions: the civil remedies provision, subsection (g), and the criminal penalties provision,
subsection (i).39 The civil remedies provision grants district courts jurisdiction to hear civil suits brought by any individual who is harmed by
an agency that failed to allow access to her records or refused a request
to amend her records—violations that are enumerated in other sections
Subsection (d) provides individuals with both access and restrictions to records pertaining to
themselves by stating, in relevant part, that each agency that maintains a system of records shall:
(1) upon request by any individual to gain access to his record or to any information
pertaining to him which is contained in the system, permit him and upon his
request, a person of his own choosing to accompany him, to review the record and
have a copy made of all or any portion thereof in a form comprehensible to him,
except that the agency may require the individual to furnish a written statement
authorizing discussion of that individual’s record in the accompanying person’s
presence;
(2) permit the individual to request amendment of a record pertaining to him
and . . .
(B) promptly, either-(i) make any correction of any portion thereof which the individual believes is not
accurate, relevant, timely, or complete; or
(ii) inform the individual of its refusal to amend the record in accordance with his
request, the reason for the refusal, the procedures established by the agency for
the individual to request a review of that refusal by the head of the agency or an
officer designated by the head of the agency, and the name and business address
of that official . . . ;
(5) nothing in this section shall allow an individual access to any information
compiled in reasonable anticipation of a civil action or proceeding.
Id. § 552a(d).
37
See id. § 552a(e) (asserting that agency shall maintain in its records only information about
individual that is relevant and necessary to accomplish agency’s purpose as required by statute
or executive order by President). Agencies are also required to publish the existence and character
of any new or revised system of records in the Federal Register, and shall maintain those records
with the accuracy, relevance, timeliness, and completeness reasonably necessary to assure fairness
to an individual. See id. § 552a(e)(4), (5).
38
See id. § 552a(e)(7) (stating that agencies shall not maintain any record describing any
individual’s exercise of rights guaranteed by First Amendment unless expressly authorized by
statute, or unless pertinent to and within scope of authorized law enforcement activity); see also infra
notes 105–07 (discussing Sixth Circuit’s holding that subsection (e)(7) was one of two subsections
pursuant to which Shearson was entitled to disclosure of documents held by DHS and CBP).
39
See § 552a(g), (i) (listing two methods under Privacy Act through which individuals may enforce
privacy rights against federal agency).
36
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of the Privacy Act.40 The criminal penalties provision allows criminal
sanctions against agency employees who willfully disclose information
in violation of the Privacy Act, against agency employees who willfully maintain records in violation of the Privacy Act, and against any
person who willfully obtains a record concerning another individual
under false pretenses.41
Finally, the general exemptions provision, subsection (j), permits
the head of an agency to promulgate rules exempting a system of
records from certain provisions of the Privacy Act as long as the system

The civil remedies provision provides, in relevant part, that whenever an agency:
(1)(a) makes a determination under subsection (d)(3) of this section not to amend
an individual’s record in accordance with his request, or fails to make such review
in conformity with that subsection; [or]
(1)(b) refuses to comply with an individual request under subsection (d)(1) of this
section . . . ;
the individual may bring a civil action against the agency, and the district courts of the
United States shall have jurisdiction in matters under the provisions of this subsection.
(2)(a) In any suit brought under the provision of subsection (g)(1)(a) of this section, the
court may order the agency to amend the individual’s record in accordance with his
request or in such other way as the court may direct. . . .
(3)(a) In any suit brought under the provision of subsection (g)(1)(b) of this section, the
court may enjoin the agency from withholding the records and order the production
to the complaintant of any agency records improperly withheld from him.
Id. § 552a(g).
41
The criminal penalties provision provides that:
(1) Any officer or employee of an agency, who by virtue of his employment or
official position, has possession of, or access to, agency records which contain
individually identifiable information the disclosure of which is prohibited by this
section or by rules or regulations established thereunder, and who knowing that
disclosure of the specific material is so prohibited, willfully discloses the material
in any manner to any person or agency not entitled to receive it, shall be guilty of
a misdemeanor and fined not more than $5,000.
(2) Any officer or employee of any agency who willfully maintains a system of
records without meeting the notice requirements of subsection (e)(4) of this section
shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and fined not more than $5,000.
Id. § 552a(i).
40
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of records meets one of the criteria set out in subsections (j)(2)(A)-(C).42
The agency must also provide a reason in the promulgated rule explaining why the system of records is being exempted from any provision
in the Privacy Act.43 There are, however, several non-exemptible provisions from which an agency may not exempt its system of records.44 The
non-exemptible provisions include the criminal penalties provision, but
significantly, the civil remedies provision is not included in that list.45
C. A Stressful Ending to the Family Vacation
Julia Shearson is a United States citizen, a Muslim, and an outspoken advocate for Muslim rights—as evidenced by her position as
42

The general exemptions provision, in relevant part, provides that:
The head of any agency may promulgate rules . . . to exempt any system of records
within the agency from any part of this section except subsections (b), (c)(1) and (2),
(e)(4)(A) through (F), (e)(6), (7), (9), (10), and (11), and (i) if the system of records is:
(1) maintained by the Central Intelligence Agency; or
(2) maintained by an agency or component thereof which performs as its principal
function any activity pertaining to the enforcement of criminal laws, including
police efforts to prevent, control, or reduce crime or to apprehend criminals, and
the activities of prosecutors, courts, correctional, probation, pardon, or parole
authorities, and which consists of (A) information compiled for the purpose of
identifying individual criminal offenders and alleged offenders and consisting
only of identifying data and notations of arrests, the nature and disposition of
criminal charges, sentencing, confinement, release, and parole and probation
status; (B) information compiled for the purpose of a criminal investigation,
including reports of informants and investigators, and associated with an
identifiable individual; or (C) reports identifiable to an individual compiled at any
stage of the process of enforcement of the criminal laws from arrest or indictment
through release from supervision.

At the time rules are adopted under this subsection, the agency shall include in the
statement required under section 553(c) of this title, the reasons why the system of
records is to be exempted from a provision of this subsection.
Id. § 552a(j).
43
See id. (noting steps agency must take in order to exempt system of records from provisions of
Privacy Act).
44
See id. (listing fourteen provisions for which agency may not use general exemptions provision
to exempt its system of records from Privacy Act requirements); see also supra note 42 (providing
text of subsection (j)).
45
See § 552a(j) (stating that following subsections are non-exemptible: subsection (b) which
prohibits disclosure of personal information except under certain conditions; subsections (c)(1)
and (2) which regulate maintenance of records and their disclosures; subsections (e)(4)(A) through
(F), which mandate that agencies publish in Federal Register certain characteristics of each system
of records maintained by agency; subsection (e)(6) which requires agencies to use reasonable
efforts to ensure accuracy and completeness of information prior to disclosure; subsection (e)(7)
which prohibits agencies from maintaining any records relating to individual’s exercise of First
Amendment rights; subsection (e)(9) which mandates that agencies develop rules of conduct
for personnel who maintain any system of records; subsection (e)(10) which requires agency
implemented safeguards to protect integrity of any system of records; and subsection (i) which
provides criminal liability for violation of certain sections of Privacy Act). The criminal penalties
provision, but not the civil remedies provision, is listed as a non-exemptible under general
exemptions provision. See id.
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a Director of the Cleveland Council on American-Islamic Relations
(“CAIR”).46 As she was driving home with her four-year old daughter
from a weekend trip to Canada on January 2, 2006, they were stopped
at the U.S. border for a routine border stop.47 When their U.S. passports
were scanned, the CBP computer flashed the words “ARMED AND
DANGEROUS.”48 Shearson and her daughter were detained several
hours for questioning and were later released without any explanation, despite Shearson’s repeated requests for information about why
she was held.49 As Shearson was leaving, she inquired as to whether a
search of her vehicle had been conducted, and she was assured by CBP
agents that no search had occurred.50
Shearson then reached out to her congressional representatives
for help, and after they also failed to gain traction with the CBP, she
submitted information requests to DHS and CBP under several sections of the Privacy Act.51 CBP searched the Treasury Enforcement
Communications System (“TECS”), its system of records, and provided
Shearson with nine pages of highly redacted documents, but several
unredacted sentences indicated that Shearson had been included

See Shearson v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 638 F.3d 498, 499 (6th Cir. 2011) (stating that
Shearson was resident of Northern District of Ohio and worked as regional office director for
Cleveland division of non-profit Muslim civil rights organization called CAIR).
47
See id. (illustrating events leading up to Shearson’s lawsuit).
48
See id. (explaining why Shearson and her daughter were detained and questioned).
49
See id. at 499–500 (describing facts of case).
50
See id. at 499 (noting that Shearson later realized, based on documents describing her
detainment, that her car had been searched by CBP agents while she was being questioned).
51
See Smith, supra note 2 (explaining that day after she was stopped for questioning, Shearson
wrote letters to two United States senators from Ohio and United States representative for her
township asking them to assist her in obtaining information from CBP regarding her border
encounter and they agreed). The CBP, however, responded to the Congressmen’s queries with
a memo refusing to divulge the requested documents and indicating that Shearson was stopped
because of a “false alert” caused by a computer mistake. See id. Shearson issued information
requests to the DHS and CBP under sections 552a(b), (d), (e)(1), (e)(4), (e)(5), and (e)(7) of the
Privacy Act. See Shearson, 638 F.3d at 499–500 (describing Shearson’s effort to uncover answers
about her detainment).
46
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on a terrorist watch list.52 At some point after the initial search, CBP
performed a second search of its system of records and uncovered three
more documents.53 CBP, however, withheld these new documents in
their entirety.54 Outraged that she had been deemed a terrorist threat,
Shearson initiated an administrative appeal and requested that all
information relating to the border stop be reissued in full.55
After several weeks without progress on her administrative appeal,
Shearson became frustrated and sought relief through the legal system.56 She filed a complaint pro se and an amended complaint pro se,
on June 15, 2006 and August 23, 2006, respectively, seeking a declaration
that DHS and CBP’s refusal to provide unredacted records, access to
documentation, and amendment of erroneous information violated the
Privacy Act.57 Her amended complaint alleged that the agency did not
take reasonable efforts to ensure the accuracy of her records, illegally
maintained records relating to her First Amendment activity, and did
not properly account for certain disclosures of personal information.58
The district court granted the agency’s summary judgment motion
and dismissed Shearson’s Privacy Act claims.59 The court concluded
that even though sections (b) and (e) were non-exemptible under subsection (j), the court lacked jurisdiction to hear Shearson’s claims under
those provisions because the agency stripped the court of jurisdiction
to hear civil complaints by exempting its system of records from the

See Shearson, 638 F.3d at 499 n.1 (describing TECS as computerized system containing
information from variety of federal, state, and local sources); see also Smith, supra note 2 (discussing
contents of redacted documents given to Shearson). Several words and phrases included in the
documents that were not redacted were “pertaining to terrorism” and Shearson’s “TSC” number,
or Terrorist Screening Center ID number. See id. (indicating how Shearson realized that she had
been included on terror watch list).
A retired FBI agent who specialized in terror financing indicated that combinations of several
activities, whether it be travel, financial activity, or internet use, can cause suspicion and land a
person on the terror watch list. See id. (explaining possible activities that may have caused DHS
and CBP to flag Shearson as potential threat to national security). Interestingly, the FBI has no
formal relationship with CAIR, which dates back to 2009 when FBI agents investigated CAIR’s
national leaders’ links to Hamas, a group that has been designated by the United States as a
terror organization. See id. (noting CAIR’s checkered past, CAIR’s insistence that it has no ties to
terrorism, and Shearson’s belief that her role in CAIR did not play any part in her being placed
on terrorist watch list because other more prominent members of group have been able to travel
freely). In addition to Shearson’s leadership position in CAIR, the father of her daughter currently
resides in Saudi Arabia. See id. (establishing another possible but, according to Shearson, unlikely
reason for her inclusion on terror watch list).
53
See Shearson, 638 F.3d at 500 (explaining factual background).
54
See id. (describing facts leading up to Shearson’s lawsuit against DHS and CBP).
55
See id. (detailing administrative appeal filed by Shearson on April 21, 2006).
56
See id.
57
See id.
58
See Shearson, 638 F.3d at 500 (stating alleged Privacy Act violations committed by defendants in
plaintiff’s legal complaint).
59
See id.
52
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civil remedies provision.60 Shearson then appealed her case to the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals.61
II. Navigating a Circuit Split: The Breadth of the
Privacy Act’s General Exemptions Provision
Has Deeply Divided the Federal Courts
The circuit courts are split regarding whether the Privacy Act’s
general exemptions provision permits a federal agency to exempt its
system of records from the civil remedies provision and thus avoid all
civil liability, even for violations of non-exemptible provisions.62 Two
decisions from the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia have held that a federal agency cannot evade liability
for violations of non-exemptible provisions by using the general
exemptions provision to exempt its system of records from the civil
remedies provision.63 In Tijerina v. Walters,64 the D.C. Circuit reasoned
that allowing the Administrator of Veteran’s Affairs (“VA”) to use the
general exemptions provision to exempt itself from the civil remedies
provision “would give agencies license to defang completely the
strict limitations on disclosure that Congress intended to impose.”65
See id. (holding that defendant’s exemption of its system of records from civil remedies
provision barred plaintiff’s claims); see also Shearson v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 06-1478,
2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16902, at *42 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 9, 2007) (stating that TECS system of records
was properly exempted under subsection (j)), vacated, 638 F.3d 498 (6th Cir. 2011). According to
the district court, the CBP is a law enforcement agency, and thus clearly fell within the exemption
provided by subsection (j)(2) of the Privacy Act for law enforcement activities. See id.
61
See Shearson, 638 F.3d at 499.
62
See id. at 502–03 (noting circuit split on this issue).
63
See infra notes 64–69 (describing narrow interpretation of general exemptions provision applied
by several courts).
64
821 F.2d 789 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
65
Id. at 797 (noting court’s reasoning). In Tijerina, Mr. Tijerina sued the VA for disclosing personal
information via an unsolicited letter to the Texas Board of Law Examiners without his consent
and in violation of the Privacy Act. See id. at 791–93 (explaining that VA learned that Mr. Tijerina,
current law student, had falsified document in connection with VA guaranteed home loan,
realized that Mr. Tijerina intended to sit for Texas bar examination, and then sent unsolicited
letter to Texas Board of Law Examiners detailing results of its investigation into Mr. Tijerina).
The VA responded that it had used the general exemptions provision to exempt its system of
records from the civil remedies provision, and therefore the plaintiff could not sue the agency in a
civil action for its disclosure. See id. at 795 (describing court’s rejection of VA’s argument because
“agency’s efforts to elude civil liability for violations of statutory duties which cannot be shirked
under the Act contravene the language of the Act and the purpose behind the general exemptions
provision”).
In support of this conclusion, the court emphasized that the general exemptions provision
permits an agency to exempt a “system of records” from the requirements of the Privacy Act,
and that the civil remedies provision is directed towards courts and aggrieved individuals, not
systems of records. See id. at 795–96 (reasoning that it “simply makes no sense for an agency to
use subsection (j) to exempt a system of records from civil liability: records are not subject to civil
liability under the Act; the United States is”). Additionally, the court observed that the general
exemptions provision was intended to permit the government to withhold access to information,
not to permit agencies to avoid liability for irresponsible disclosure. See id. at 796.

60
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The court suggested, however, that the exemption of some systems
of records under the Privacy Act was justified because they related to
law enforcement activities that required a certain amount of secrecy.66
Four years later, the D.C. Circuit clarified Tijerina in the dicta of Doe
v. Federal Bureau of Investigation, and stated that, “the touchstone for
an agency’s liability to suit under the Act is the substantive obligation
underlying the plaintiff’s claim.”67 Together, these two decisions stand
for the proposition that an agency can exempt its system of records
from the civil remedies provision only to the extent that the substantive
provision that has been violated is also exemptible under the general
exemptions provision.68
A divergent line of federal appellate and district court opinions has
held that a federal agency can use the general exemptions provision
to entirely exempt a system of records from the civil remedies provision.69 In Ryan v. U.S. Department of Justice, the Fourth Circuit held
that the general exemptions provision permits an agency to exempt
its system of records from the civil remedies provision if the proper
rules have been promulgated by the agency.70 Similarly, the Seventh
Circuit explained in Kimberlin v. U.S. Department of Justice that systems
of records can be exempted from the civil remedies provision pursuant

Tijerina, 821 F.2d at 796 (noting that broad language of general exemptions provision was
acceptable because certain records contain particularly sensitive information that cannot be
released).
67
936 F.2d 1346, 1352 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (holding that agency cannot escape liability for violating
non-exemptible Privacy Act obligations by exempting its system of records from Privacy Act’s civil
remedies provision).
68
See supra notes 64–67 (describing narrow interpretation of general exemptions provision taken
by these two courts).
69
See infra notes 70–74 (discussing broad interpretation of general exemptions provision that
several courts have adopted).
70
595 F.2d 954, 958 (4th Cir. 1979) (explaining that agency may use general exemptions provision
to exempt its system of records from civil remedies provision as long as agency follows proper
steps). In Ryan, the plaintiff, a security officer for the FBI, requested a memorandum from the
Justice Department that he alleged dealt with the removal, insulation, and reassignment of official
actions he had taken with respect to an investigation of surreptitious entries by FBI agents. See
id. at 955–56. After the plaintiff commenced his action, a Justice Department attorney told the
Washington Post that the requested document said that the plaintiff was “getting in the way
of investigations,” and the plaintiff responded by amending his complaint to include a claim
for wrongful disclosure under the Privacy Act. See id. (discussing events leading to plaintiff’s
wrongful disclosure claim under Privacy Act).
The Justice Department asserted that the plaintiff lacked a cause of action because the Justice
Department had exempted its system of records from the civil remedies provision pursuant to the
general exemptions provision. See id. The court agreed that agencies can avoid civil liability for
violations of the Privacy Act by utilizing the general exemptions provision to exempt its system of
records from the civil remedies provision, but that the Justice Department had failed to follow the
correct procedures in this case. See id. at 956–58 (stating court’s reasoning that Justice Department
could have exempted its system of records from civil remedies provision had agency not failed to
state its reasons for exemption).
66
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to the general exemptions provision, but that the Department of Justice
failed to abide by the necessary exemption procedures.71
Lastly, in Alexander v. United States, the Ninth Circuit held that the
plaintiff’s claims against the FBI for passing inaccurate information
to a third party were barred.72 In that case, the Department of Justice
properly promulgated rules pursuant to the general exemptions provision and successfully exempted its system of records from the civil
remedies provision.73 These cases advance the notion that, if an agency
follows the prescribed administrative procedures, it can utilize the
general exemptions provision to exempt its system of records from any

788 F.2d 434, 436 (7th Cir. 1986) (noting court’s holding that system of records can be exempted
from civil remedies provision pursuant to general exemptions provision if required procedures
are followed). The plaintiff in Kimberlin was convicted for detonating an explosive device, and Ms.
DeLong subsequently won a civil judgment against the plaintiff for injuries to her husband that
were caused by the explosion. See id. Thomas Gahl, the plaintiff’s probation officer, sent a letter to
the warden of plaintiff’s jail to inform him of the civil judgment, and Patrick Leddy, the plaintiff’s
prison case manager, informed Gahl that the plaintiff regularly sent money from his prisoner
commissary account to an individual outside the prison. See id. (providing background that led
to DeLong obtaining writ of attachment against plaintiff’s commissary account, and plaintiff’s
response that Leddy violated Privacy Act by disclosing his personal information). In the course
of its analysis, the court noted that a system can be exempted from the civil remedies provision
according to the general exemptions provision, but that the exemption did not apply in this case
because the Justice Department neglected to provide a reason for the exemption. See id. at 436
n.2 (citing Kimberlin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 605 F. Supp. 79, 82 (N.D. Ill. 1985)) (stating that only
reason given for exemption was that records are exempt from subsection (d), which only relates to
record access, and not to disclosure of those records to third parties which is at issue here).
72
787 F.2d 1349, 1351–52 (9th Cir. 1986) (expressing court’s holding that general exemptions
provision of Privacy Act permitted agency to exempt its system of records from civil remedies
provision).
73
See id. (explaining reasoning for court’s holding). In Alexander, the plaintiff was conditionally
hired as a security officer pending a background check from the FBI. See id. at 1350. The FBI
sent the plaintiff’s employer his “rap sheet” which contained information that resulted in the
termination of the plaintiff’s employment. See id. (describing events leading to plaintiff filing suit
against government for negligence in failing to remove information on two previous arrests from
his record that he believed California court had expunged). The court held that the plaintiff had
no cause of action because the Department of Justice had properly exempted its system of records
from the civil remedies provision. See id. at 1351–52; see also Pagani-Gallego v. Sabol, No. 07-40016PBS, 2008 WL 886032, at *6 (D. Mass. Mar. 27, 2008) (holding that plaintiff’s cause of action was
barred because Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) properly exempted its system of records from civil
remedies provision of Privacy Act pursuant to general exemptions provision). In Pagani-Gallego,
the plaintiff, a prisoner, was investigated for his possible participation in a suspected prison
escape plot involving a helicopter. See id. at *1. Despite the fact that officials determined there was
insufficient evidence to discipline the plaintiff, his security management variable was increased
and this prevented him from being transferred to a lesser security facility. See id. (describing
impetus for plaintiff’s Privacy Act claim). The court held, however, that the plaintiff’s claims for
access to and amendment of his records were ineffective because of the BOP’s use of the general
exemptions provision to exempt its system of records from the civil remedies provision. See id. at
*6; Robinson v. Vazquez, No. CV207-082, 2007 WL 4209370, at *1 (S.D. Ga. Nov. 26, 2007) (noting
that, despite availability of relief under civil remedies provision, general exemptions provision
permits agency to establish regulations to exempt system of records from requirements of Privacy
Act).
71
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subsection of the Privacy Act that is not explicitly listed as non-exemptible
in subsection (j).74
III. The Sixth Circuit Untangles Each Party’s Arguments
The parties articulated statutory interpretations of the Privacy Act
that were diametrically opposed.75 Both parties relied on the Privacy
Act’s legislative history and purpose to bolster their statutory interpretations.76 After weighing all of the evidence, the Sixth Circuit sided
with Shearson and held that the statutory language and purpose of
the Privacy Act would be contravened if DHS and CBP were permitted to entirely exempt their systems of records from the civil remedies
provision.77
A. A Federal Agency May Not Exempt Its System of Records
from the Civil Remedies Provision
Shearson cited the purpose and legislative history of the Privacy
Act to support her position that a federal agency cannot exempt its system of records from the civil remedies provision through the general
exemptions provision.78 Shearson argued that the Privacy Act’s creation was prompted by the privacy abuses that took place during the
Watergate scandal and the government’s desire to mend the public’s
general perception that federal officials were disregarding fundamental privacy rights.79 With this as a backdrop for the legislation, Shearson
contended it logically followed that Congress entrusted plaintiffs who
were seeking civil remedies in court, and not the government itself,

See supra notes 70–73 (discussing broad interpretation of general exemptions provision).
See Shearson v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 638 F.3d 498, 502 (6th Cir. 2011) (laying out
Shearson’s position that agency cannot exempt its system of records from subsection (g) pursuant
to subsection (j), and defendants’ argument that all of Shearson’s claims are barred because
its system of records was properly exempted from subsection (g)); see also infra notes 78–100
(discussing statutory arguments made by parties in detail).
76
See Shearson, 638 F.3d at 502–05 (recognizing arguments made by parties in support of statutory
interpretation).
77
See id. at 502–04 (detailing court’s analysis of case and reasons for decision in favor of Shearson).
78
See infra notes 82–96 (laying out framework for plaintiff’s argument).
79
See Nakash v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 708 F. Supp. 1354, 1359–60 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (“Privacy Act
was a product of the post-Watergate reform era and represented an effort by the Congress to
begin to control the collection and dissemination of information about individuals by the federal
government.”). The court also noted that Representative Moorhead, who presented the House
Bill, explained that Americans wanted more government credibility and the removal of any undue
governmental power that could be used to invade an individual’s personal privacy. See id. at
1359; see also Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579 § 2(a), 88 Stat. 1896, 1896 (1974) (mentioning
growing concern over government’s accumulation, use, and dissemination of personal information
as impetus for Privacy Act).
74
75
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to ensure accountability for Privacy Act violations.80 Consistent with
this interpretation, Shearson insisted that the inclusion of the criminal
penalties provision—and not the civil remedies provision—among
the list of non-exemptible provisions was insignificant and misleading
because the criminal penalties provision was added amidst confusion
at the last minute as a technical amendment.81
According to Shearson, the list of non-exemptible provisions
proved Congress’s intent that federal agencies be subject to the liability
created by these subsections, and that the civil remedies provision be
used to enforce them.82 Additionally, Shearson asserted that the agency’s interpretation that it can exempt its system of records from any
provision except those specifically listed as non-exemptible is untenable because it would flout the Privacy Act’s purpose and could lead to
absurd results.83
Shearson then turned to the legislative history to support her
interpretation of the Privacy Act.84 Shearson alleged that nothing in the
legislative history of the Privacy Act indicated that Congress intended
to allow agencies to exempt themselves from the civil remedies provision.85 Shearson also relied on comments in the legislative history that
exhibited a congressional desire to provide citizens with recourse to
See Petitioner’s Brief Submitted Pro Se at 17, Shearson v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 638 F.3d
498 (6th Cir. 2011) (No. 08-4582) (arguing that lack of ability by government to regulate itself in
past spurred creation of Privacy Act, and that civil remedies provision was included to ensure
government credibility with respect to personal information stored by agencies).
81
See Nakash, 708 F. Supp. at 1363–64 (suggesting that criminal penalties provision was added to
close “perceived but nonexistent loophole”). The court goes on to note that a significant amount
of the Privacy Act’s drafting occurred in the commotion of the closing days of the congressional
session, and that one of the Privacy Act’s sponsors admitted that the legislation was “far from
perfect.” See id. at 1364 (declaring that “relatively little weight can be given to the last-minute and
largely inexplicable addition of subsection (i) to the list of exclusions in the general exemption
provision”); see also Petitioner’s Brief Submitted Pro Se, supra note 80, at 22–26 (stating that general
exemptions provision was poorly drafted and that court must look to Privacy Act’s purpose and
legislative history to address this deficiency).
82
See Petitioner’s Brief Submitted Pro Se, supra note 80, at 2 (stating that without civil remedies,
agencies are not liable for violations of any subsection of Privacy Act, even those that Congress
explicitly listed as non-exemptible); see also Tijerina v. Walters, 821 F.2d 789, 793–94 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
(explaining that “[t]he principal enforcement mechanism for individuals whose rights under the
Privacy Act have been violated is the provision for civil remedies contained in subsection (g)”).
83
See Petitioner’s Brief Submitted Pro Se, supra note 80, at 21–22 (noting that allowing federal
agency to exempt its system of records from any subsection not listed as non-exemptible defeats
Privacy Act’s purpose of ensuring government accountability). The plaintiff also pointed out that
the definitions section, subsection (a), is not listed as a non-exemptible provision, and that a federal
agency could theoretically exempt its system of records from that provision as well. See id.
84
See infra notes 85–86.
85
See Nakash, 708 F. Supp. at 1360 (noting lack of indication that either House or Senate even
considered allowing agencies to exempt their system of records from civil remedies provision as
compelling reason not to construe Privacy Act in manner that permits it to occur); see also Tijerina,
821 F.2d at 797 (explaining court’s discomfort with notion that Congress forbade agencies to
violate Privacy Act provisions, but yet intended for agencies to be able to evade civil liability for
those violations).
80
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defend against Privacy Act violations.86 Furthermore, Shearson claimed
that even if the Privacy Act’s purpose and legislative history supported
the government’s argument, it would be a moot point because the DHS
failed to properly exempt its system of records from the Privacy Act’s
requirements.87 Shearson argued that the DHS’s attempt to exempt
its system of records under the general exemptions provision of the
Privacy Act failed because its rule promulgation was limited to a notice
of proposed rule-making, and a final rule was never promulgated.88
Moreover, even if the rule promulgation did satisfy the Privacy
Act’s requirements, Shearson contended that the DHS’s exemption did
not bar her claims.89 The rules promulgated by the DHS and CBP only
exempted the system of records from the civil remedies provision to
the extent that the system of records was exempt from other provisions
of the Privacy Act.90 The system of records was not exempt from the
fourteen non-exemptible provisions listed under subsection (j), including subsections (b) and (e) under which Shearson sued the agencies,
and therefore she alleged that she could still receive a remedy for the
violation.91 Finally, Shearson asserted that the Automated Targeting
System (“ATS”), a subsystem of the TECS system of records, did not
meet any of the law enforcement exemption criteria set out in section
552a(j)(2)(A)–(C).92

See Legislative History of the Privacy Act, supra note 28, at 235 (mentioning grant of authority
to citizens to protect against Privacy Act violations through civil suits).
87
See infra notes 88–92 (discussing exemption procedures under subsection (j) for system of
records).
88
See Petitioner’s Brief Submitted Pro Se, supra note 80, at 26–28 (asserting that notice is legally
insufficient to satisfy general exemptions clause’s requirement that agencies “promulgate rules”
to avail itself of any exemptions); see also Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(j) (1974) (stating
requirements agency must follow in order to exempt system of records).
89
See Petitioner’s Brief Submitted Pro Se, supra note 80, at 28–29 (arguing that exempting language
used by agency was insufficient to exempt its system of records from subsection (g)); see also infra
notes 90–92 (fleshing out Shearson’s position).
90
See Privacy Act of 1974: Implementation of Exemptions; Automated Targeting System, 72 Fed.
Reg. 43,567, 43,569 (Aug. 6, 2007) (to be codified at 6 C.F.R. pt. 5) (exempting system of records “[f]
rom subsection (g) to the extent that the system is exempt from other specific subsections of the
Privacy Act”).
91
See Petitioner’s Brief Submitted Pro Se, supra note 80, at 28–29 (alleging that, because subsections
(b) and (e)(7) were listed as non-exemptible provisions, exempting subsection (g) “to the extent
that the system is exempt from other specific subsections” meant that civil liability was still
available for violation of subsections (b) and (e)(7)).
92
See id. at 29–34 (asserting that exemptions criteria were not satisfied because amount and type of
information collected by DHS proved that information was not being used to identify “individual
criminal offenders” under subsection (j)(2)(A), nor was it used “for the purpose of a criminal
investigation” under subsection (j)(2)(B), or for “the process of enforcement of criminal laws”
under subsection (j)(2)(C)); see also § 552a(j) (laying out requirements to exempt system of records
under subsections 552a(j)(2)(A)–(C)).
86
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B. “No” Means “No” and If a Provision Is Not Listed
as Non-Exemptible, It Is Exemptible
The DHS utilized the text, structure, and legislative history of
the Privacy Act, as well as the Office of Management and Budget’s
(“OMB’s”) statutory interpretation and prior case law, to support its
position that all of the plaintiff’s Privacy Act claims were barred.93 The
DHS argued that its exemption was proper because the plain language
of the general exemptions provision, subsection (j), states that a federal agency can exempt its system of records from any provision of
the Privacy Act except those explicitly listed as non-exemptible under
subsection (j).94 As the DHS points out, the civil remedies provision is
absent from that list.95 The structure of the Privacy Act, with multiple
enforcement mechanisms, confirmed Congress’s intent that alternative
methods be utilized in place of the civil remedies provision in private
civil suits to ensure that federal agencies complied with their Privacy
Act obligations.96 The legislative history highlighted the amendments
to the Privacy Act’s wording and furthered the conclusion, supported
by the text and structure of the Privacy Act, that Congress did not
intend for private civil enforcement of the Privacy Act for systems of
records that had been exempted from the civil remedies provision.97
In addition to the clear language and legislative intent behind the
Privacy Act, agencies and courts have interpreted the general exemptions provision to allow agencies to exempt their systems of records

See infra notes 94–100 (detailing defendant’s position).
See § 552a(j) (stating that “head of any agency may promulgate rules, in accordance with the
requirements . . . of this title, to exempt any system of records within the agency from any part
of this section except subsections (b), (c)(1) and (2), (e)(4)(A) through (F), (e)(6), (7), (9), (10), and
(11), and (i)”); see also Shearson v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 06-1478, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
16902, at *42 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 9, 2007) (stating that “Congress clearly contemplated which types
of enforcement remedies would be available against individuals and/or agencies” and concluded
civil enforcement would not be available remedy for system of records exempted under subsection
(j)), vacated, 638 F.3d 498 (6th Cir. 2011).
95
See § 552a(j) (containing list of non-exemptible provisions, but subsection (g) is not included).
96
See Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579 § 3, 88 Stat. 1896, 1902 (1974) (detailing supplemental
enforcement mechanisms including criminal penalties provision and requirement that President
provide annual report to Congress listing any system of records that had been exempted within
prior year and reasons for agency’s exemption).
97
See Legislative History of the Privacy Act, supra note 28, at 249 (showing that original
versions of Privacy Act introduced in House and Senate would have allowed any individual
injured by violation of Privacy Act to sue). The legislation was amended, however, to allow
the head of an agency to exempt a system of records from the majority of the requirements
pursuant to subsection (j), thus suggesting that Congress did not intend for civil suits to be the
primary enforcement mechanism. See generally Brief for Defendants-Appellees at 10–11 Shearson
v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 638 F.3d 498 (6th Cir. 2011) (No. 08-4582) (stating defendant’s
argument); see generally § 552a(j) (allowing agency heads to exempt system of records from certain
requirements of Privacy Act).
93
94
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from the civil remedies provision.98 OMB—the federal agency in
charge of prescribing guidelines for the Privacy Act and overseeing
its implementation—construed the general exemptions provision to
allow an agency to exempt a system of records from the civil remedies provision.99 Furthermore, several federal appellate courts have
held that the general exemptions provision allowed a federal agency
to exempt its system of records from the civil remedies provision of
the Privacy Act.100
C. On the Straight and Narrow: The Sixth Circuit Narrowly
Interprets the Breadth of the General Exemptions Provision
In analyzing the Privacy Act, the court began with the plain language of the statute.101 The court noted that the general exemptions
provision’s list of non-exemptible provisions did not contain the civil
remedies provision, and therefore the natural reading of the statute
supported the view that an agency can exempt a system of records from
the requirements of the civil remedies provision.102 Upon closer inspection, however, the court pointed out that the general exemptions provision lists non-exemptible provisions whose violation must be resolved
through the civil remedies provision, thus implying that an agency
cannot avoid civil liability for the violation of those non-exemptible
provisions.103 After acknowledging the two potential statutory interpretations, the court examined the prior case law and recognized that
the issue implicated a circuit split in authority.104
Given the uncertainty over the Privacy Act’s text and the circuit
split on the issue, the court turned to the congressional intent behind
its inclusion of the criminal penalties provision, subsection (i), but not
the civil remedies provision, subsection (g), among the non-exemptible
See infra notes 99–100 (discussing how agencies and courts have interpreted language of general
exemptions provision).
99
See § 552a(v) (stating that Director of OMB shall: “(1) develop and, after notice and opportunity
for public comment, prescribe guidelines and regulations for the use of agencies in implementing
the provisions of this section; and (2) provide continuing assistance to and oversight of the
implementation of this section by agencies”); see also OMB, Privacy Act Implementation:
Guidelines and Responsibilities, 40 Fed. Reg. 28,947, 28,971 (July 9, 1975) (noting that OMB
guidelines state that “[e]xemptions under subsection (j) may be exempted from the civil remedies
provision”).
100
For a discussion of federal court decisions holding that an agency may exempt its system of
records from the civil remedies provision pursuant to the general exemptions provision, see supra
notes 70–74 and accompanying text.
101
See infra notes 102–03 and accompanying text (describing court’s analysis of Privacy Act’s plain
language).
102
See Shearson v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 638 F.3d 498, 502 (6th Cir. 2011).
103
See id. (examining possible interpretations of Privacy Act’s text).
104
For a discussion of the circuit split, as well as the factual background and judicial analysis for
each case, see supra notes 64–74 and accompanying text.
98
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provisions.105 Ultimately, the court determined that subsection (i) and
subsection (g) were not parallel provisions, and therefore the inclusion of one and the omission of the other was not instructive.106 After
distinguishing the two subsections based on their structure, the court
decided that Doe v. Federal Bureau of Investigation expressed the better
interpretation, concluded that Congress intended for the remedy to follow the violation, and endorsed the minority view in the circuit split.107
IV. Security Breach! A Critical Analysis
of the Sixth Circuit’s Opinion
The Sixth Circuit found support for its holding in the legislative
intent, but the Privacy Act’s plain language and legislative history point
to a different result that is more consistent with the canons of statutory interpretation and national security policy.108 When determining
the meaning of a statute, the starting point is the statutory language
itself.109 Here, the statutory language seems clear: Congress provided
a general exemptions provision and listed in that provision several
subsections of the Privacy Act that could not be exempted.110 Although
significant debate exists over the court’s role in interpreting statutes,
canons of statutory interpretation dictate that when the statutory language is plain and unambiguous, the court’s sole responsibility is to
apply that language.111 Therefore, the court should have adhered to the
plain language of the Privacy Act in its analysis and permitted the DHS
See infra notes 106–07 and accompanying text (providing discussion of congressional intent
behind composition of general exemptions provision’s list of non-exemptible provisions).
106
See Shearson, 638 F.3d at 503–04 (remarking that subsection (i) is only section that makes
certain conduct criminal and therefore must be non-exemptible, whereas subsection (g) is strictly
enforcement provision that refers to duties set forth in other subsections). The court bolstered this
argument by noting that Congress omitted subsection (h), which states that a guardian may act on
behalf of a minor or incapacitated person, from the list of non-exemptible provisions. See id. at 504
(explaining that subsection (h), like subsection (g), does not impose substantive duties, but that it is
unlikely Congress intended to permit agency to exempt its system of records from subsection (h)).
For text of the civil remedies and criminal penalties provisions, see supra notes 40–41.
107
See Shearson, 638 F.3d at 504 (holding that agency may exempt system of records from civil
remedies provision only if underlying substantive duty is exemptible under general exemptions
provision).
108
See infra notes 109–22 (discussing alternative analysis to that used by court).
109
See Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917) (“It is elementary that the meaning of a
statute must, in the first instance, be sought in the language in which the act is framed, and if that
is plain . . . the sole function of the courts is to enforce it according to its terms.”).
110
See Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(j) (1974) (listing specific provisions as non-exemptible in
text of general exemptions provision).
111
See Caminetti, 242 U.S. at 485 (“Where the language is plain and admits of no more than
one meaning, the duty of interpretation does not arise, and the rules which are to aid doubtful
meanings need no discussion.”); Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 185 n.29 (1978) (“When
confronted with a statute which is plain and unambiguous on its face, we ordinarily do not look
to legislative history as a guide to its meaning.”). But see Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490
U.S. 504, 511 (1989) (explaining that plain text did not resolve textual ambiguities, and that history
leading up to enactment of statute must be examined for guidance).
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and CBP to exempt its system of records from the civil remedies provision because it was not listed among the non-exemptible provisions.112
Even assuming that the Sixth Circuit was correct in concluding that
the statutory language was unclear, the relevant precedent also supports
a finding that the DHS and CBP were permitted to exempt their system
of records from the civil remedies provision.113 In siding with the minority view, the court found that the decisions in Tijerina and Doe expressed
“the better view.”114 The facts of Tijerina, however, are distinguishable
because Tijerina dealt with the VA sending an unsolicited letter containing personal information to another agency in violation of the Privacy
Act, whereas the current case involves Shearson’s attempt to access and
revise her own personal files.115 Similarly, the decision in Doe can be distinguished because the relevant discussion in Doe was contained in dicta
and only clarified the court’s previous holding in Tijerina.116
See supra note 111 (providing support for applying plain language of statute). Indeed, some
scholars would argue that the plain language should always control, and that the legislative
history and legislative intent of a statute should rarely, if ever, be consulted. See Antonin Scalia,
A Matter of Interpretation 33–35 (1997) (noting that legislative history used to constitute
development of statute and attempts by Congressmen to persuade those voting on piece of
legislation). Now that it is universally expected for courts to look to legislative history, however,
its primary purpose has become to affect judicial decisions rather than to inform members of
Congress about a particular statute. See id. at 33–36 (explaining unreliable nature of legislative
history and that legislative history of any major piece of legislation offers support for both sides).
According to some scholars, the legislative intent is equally unhelpful. See Max Radin, Statutory
Interpretation, 43 Harv. L. Rev. 863, 870–71 (1930) (disparaging legislative intent as means for
statutory interpretation). According to Radin, the legislative intent is undiscoverable in any real
sense, and any external signs of agreement with a piece of legislation could be motivated by many
different forces. See id. at 870 (explaining that chances of several hundred Congressmen having
same statutory meanings in mind is infinitesimally small). Moreover, even if the legislative intent
were discoverable, it would have no binding legal force. See id. at 871 (emphasizing that function
of Congressmen is not to impose their will on citizens, but instead to draft and enact statutes).
Justice Scalia concurred with this reasoning. See Scalia, supra at 22 (“The text is the law, and it is
the text which must be observed.”).
113
See infra notes 114–16 (discussing support for agency’s ability to exempt system of records from
civil remedies provision); see also Shearson v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 638 F.3d 498, 502–03
(6th Cir. 2011) (noting that case presented issue of first impression and analyzing circuit split for
insight).
114
See Shearson, 638 F.3d at 503–04 (explaining why court sided with minority view).
115
See Tijerina v. Walters, 821 F.2d 789, 795–97 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (explaining that purpose of
subsection (j) was to permit agencies to withhold access to sensitive information in attempt to
avoid hampering law enforcement efforts). Because subsection (j) was not intended to permit
agencies to avoid liability for disclosure, the provision did not protect the VA from liability for
the disclosure of personal information. See id. at 796 (explaining distinction between access to
and disclosure of information kept in system of records). But in Shearson’s case, protecting law
enforcement efforts were among the listed reasons why the DHS exempted its system of records.
See Privacy Act of 1974: Implementation of Exemptions; Automated Targeting System, 72 Fed. Reg.
43,567, 43,569 (Aug. 6, 2007) (to be codified at 6 C.F.R. pt. 5) (listing need to “avoid disclosure of
investigative techniques” and to “safeguard sensitive information” as reasons why DHS exempted
its system of records).
116
See Doe v. Fed. Bureau of Investigation, 936 F.2d 1346, 1352 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (explaining holding
in Tijerina and stating that agency cannot avoid liability for violating non-exemptible provisions by
exempting its system of records from civil remedies provision).
112
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After adopting the minority view in the circuit split, the court turned
to the congressional intent to justify its holding.117 The court concluded
that Congress’s inclusion of the criminal penalties provision, subsection (i), but not the civil remedies provision, subsection (g), among
the general exemptions provision’s list of non-exemptible provisions
was “not instructive” because subsections (g) and (i) were not parallel
provisions.118 The court suggested that subsection (i) had to be listed as
non-exemptible because it was a stand-alone provision, but subsection
(g) did not because it provided remedies for violations listed in other
sections of the Privacy Act, some of which were non-exemptible.119
Subsection (i), however, also refers to duties listed in other nonexemptible subsections and provides recourse for their violation,
indicating that subsections (g) and (i) are more similar than the court
thought.120 In addition, the legislative history shows that earlier versions of the Privacy Act allowed individuals to bring civil actions
against an agency whenever it violated a provision of the Privacy Act,
whereas the current version of the statute allows an agency head to
exempt its system of records from many of the Privacy Act requirements.121 Therefore, a more plausible explanation of the congressional
intent is that Congress envisioned criminal penalties to be available
at all times, but gave agencies flexibility to exempt themselves from
certain civil remedies in an effort to avoid hampering law enforcement
activity.122
Several other arguments advanced by Shearson, but not considered by the court, were equally unconvincing.123 In her brief, Shearson
argued that the general exemptions provision does not apply to
the civil remedies provision because the general exemptions provision permits an agency to exempt a “system of records,” and the
See Shearson, 638 F.3d at 503–04 (analyzing congressional intent behind drafting of Privacy Act).
See id. (discussing different functions of subsections (g) and (i) as justification for Congress’s
decision not to list subsection (g) as non-exemptible).
119
See id. (explaining subsection (g)’s nature as strictly enforcement provision because it provided
recourse for duties set forth in other sections, whereas subsection (i) had to be listed as nonexemptible because there was no other section that criminalized and imposed penalties for certain
conduct).
120
See Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(i)(2) (1974) (providing criminal sanctions against
any agency employee “who willfully maintains a system of records without meeting the notice
requirements of subsection (e)(4) of this section”).
121
See Legislative History of the Privacy Act of 1974, supra note 28, at 249 (noting that original
version of Privacy Act provided citizens with right to enforce Privacy Act violations against agency
via civil suits). The current version of the Privacy Act, however, allows the head of an agency to
promulgate rules exempting its system of records from many of the Privacy Act’s provisions. See
also § 552a(j) (stating requirements for exemptions).
122
See Brief for Defendants-Appellees, supra note 97, at 13 (discussing significance that must be
given to Congress’s decision to leave subsection (g) out of list of non-exemptible provisions).
123
See infra notes 124–30 and accompanying text (providing rebuttal of additional arguments
advanced by Shearson but not taken under review by court).
117
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civil remedies provision does not explicitly refer to any “system of
records.”124 This argument fails because the criminal penalties provision, which is listed under the general exemptions provision as nonexemptible, also does not specifically refer to a system of records.125
Indeed the court in Nakash v. U.S. Department of Justice, a case heavily
relied on by Shearson in her brief, noted that the reasoning in Tijerina
was undermined because subsection (i)’s inclusion as a non-exemptible
provision clearly indicated that subsection (j) applied to subsections
that did not explicitly refer to a “system of records.”126
Similarly, Shearson argued at length that the DHS did not properly
exempt its system of records, either because the DHS did not promulgate
a proper rule, because the language of the exemption was insufficient,
or because the system of records did not meet the exemption requirements of subsection (j).127 Not only would these claims be procedurally
barred because Shearson failed to raise them in the district court, but
they also lack merit.128 While Shearson correctly pointed out that the
See Petitioner’s Brief Submitted Pro Se, supra note 80, at 24–25 (arguing that civil remedies
provision does not refer to system of records and that it is directed towards courts and aggrieved
citizens, not agencies).
125
See § 552a(i) (providing text of criminal penalties provision); see also Brief for DefendantsAppellees, supra note 97, at 10 (explaining that Congress did not limit scope of subsection (j)’s
exemptions to subsections that specifically refer to “system of records” as evidenced by subsection
(i)’s inclusion in text of subsection (j)). Defendant argued further that it would not make any sense
for Congress to explicitly reference a subsection of the Privacy Act in the general exemptions
provision—subsection (i)—if that subsection could not be exempted because it did not specifically
refer to a system of records. See id.
126
See Nakash v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 708 F. Supp. 1354, 1362–63 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (explaining
weakness in Tijerina court’s logic). According to the court in Nakash, the criminal penalties
provision is similar to the civil remedies provision because neither subsection specifically
references a “system of records.” See id. at 1363 (recognizing that Tijerina court’s premise that civil
remedies provision cannot be subject to terms of general exemptions provision because it did not
refer to system of records was undermined by subsection (i)’s status as non-exemptible provision
under subsection (j)).
127
See Petitioner’s Brief Submitted Pro Se, supra note 80, at 26–34 (alleging failure of DHS to
properly exempt its system of records from Privacy Act requirements under general exemptions
provision). First, Shearson argued that the DHS never promulgated a proper rule because the rule
promulgation was limited to a notice of proposed rule-making. See id. at 27 (describing claimed
lack of finality, and thus effectiveness, of promulgated rule). Second, Shearson alleged that the
language of the exemption was insufficient to exempt the civil remedies provision from the
general exemptions provision because that exemption was limited to the extent that it was exempt
from other subsections of the Privacy Act. See Privacy Act of 1974: Implementation of Exemptions;
Automated Targeting System, 72 Fed. Reg. 43,567, 43,569 (Aug. 6, 2007) (to be codified at 6 C.F.R.
pt. 5) (describing extent of exemption); see also Petitioner’s Brief Submitted Pro Se, supra note
80, at 26–34 (claiming that this action was not sufficient to permit DHS to exempt civil remedies
provision from Privacy Act). Finally, Shearson contended that the DHS’s system of records did not
fall within the law enforcement exemption requirements of subsection (j). See § 552a(j)(2)(A)–(C)
(providing requirements for exemption under general exemptions provision); see also Petitioner’s
Brief Submitted Pro Se, supra note 80, at 26–34 (alleging that none of law enforcement criteria set
out in subsections (j)(2)(A)–(C) are met).
128
See Brief for Defendants-Appellees, supra note 97, at 13 (advocating for rejection of Shearson’s
claims regarding allegedly inadequate exemption procedures used by DHS); see also infra notes
129–30 (analyzing merit of Shearson’s claims).
124
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DHS issued a proposed rule-making to exempt the ATS—one of the
agency’s systems of records—from certain provisions of the Privacy
Act, the ATS was still covered by the exemption for the TECS system of
records.129 Moreover, while it is likely that the ATS also qualifies under
the criteria laid out in subsections 552a(j)(2)(A) and 552a(j)(2)(C), the
ATS clearly falls within the scope of 552a(j)(2)(B) which requires that
the exempted system of records consist of “information compiled for
the purpose of a criminal investigation, including reports of informants
and investigators, and associated with an identifiable individual.”130
The Potential Impact: A Narrowing of National Security?
Shearson’s case has garnered significant media attention, and
the implications could be far-reaching.131 The public remains heavily
divided over whether individual privacy should be sacrificed to increase
security, and if so, what forms of privacy invasion were acceptable.132
Although polls will always differ, there seems to be a general consenSee Privacy Act of 1974: Implementation of Exemptions; Automated Targeting System, 72 Fed.
Reg. at 43,569 (proposing new exemption rule). Shearson saw this notice but failed to realize the
fact that the ATS, which is a part of the TECS, was still covered by an exemption under the Privacy
Act for the TECS system of records. See, e.g., 31 C.F.R. § 1.36 (2000) (exempting ATS and TECS from
several Privacy Act provisions, including civil remedies provision).
130
§ 552a(j)(2)(B) (listing one criteria for exempting system of records under general exemptions
provision); see also Brief for Defendants-Appellees, supra note 97, at 29 (explaining that TECS system
of records collects information about people entering and exiting United States in order to identify
potential law breakers and, specifically in case of ATS, to identify potential terrorists). Significantly,
nothing in subsection (j)(2)(B) prevents the exemption of a system of records that is compiled
for investigations whose scope is broader than a single individual or offense. See id. (asserting
compliance of ATS and TECS with exemption criteria set out in general exemptions provision).
131
See Appeals Court Rules Ohio Activist’s Privacy Case May Proceed, Charity & Sec. Network
(May 1, 2011), http://www.charityandsecurity.org/news/Appeals_Court_Rules_Ohio_Activist_
Privacy_Case_Proceed (discussing Sixth Circuit’s holding in Shearson’s case); DHS Can’t “Opt
Out” of Liability for Violating the Privacy Act, Papers, Please!: The Identity Project (Apr. 21,
2011), http://www.papersplease.org/wp/2011/04/21/ (theorizing on national implications of Sixth
Circuit’s holding); Federal Appeals Court Affirms Civil Penalties in Privacy Act Case, Electronic
Privacy Info. Ctr. (Apr. 25, 2011), http://epic.org/2011/04/federal-appeals-court-affirms-1.html
(discussing holding of case); Ben Kerschberg, Should Government Agencies Be Able to Exempt
Themselves From the Privacy Act?, Forbes (Apr. 26, 2011, 11:57 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
benkerschberg/2011/04/26/should-government-agencies-be-able-to-exempt-themselves-from-theprivacy-act/ (recognizing potential for Shearson’s case to prompt Supreme Court to grant certiorari
and settle circuit split, or for Congress to pass legislative amendments to Privacy Act); Smith, supra
note 2 (describing details of Shearson’s legal battle).
132
See Kristin Fisher, Privacy vs. Security: New AP Poll Ten Years After 9/11, WUSA (Sept. 6, 2011 6:00
PM), http://www.wusa9.com/news/article/165944/373/Privacy-vs-Security-New-Poll-10-YearsAfter-911 (reporting that sixty-four percent of Americans admit that sometimes it is necessary
to forego individual privacy to fight terrorism); Morales, supra note 16 (commenting that large
majority of frequent travelers view preventing acts of terrorism as outweighing any potential
loss of privacy). But see Jennifer Agiesta & Nancy Benac, Poll: OK to Trade Some Freedoms to Fight
Terrorism, The Associated Press (Sept. 6, 2011, 12:43 PM), http://www.apnorc.org/news-media/
Pages/News+Media/poll-ok-to-trade-some-freedoms-to-fight-terrorism.aspx (finding that fifty-four
percent of American would choose preserving rights and freedoms over protecting people from
terrorists).
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sus that additional security is desired, so long as the privacy invasions
are not extensive.133
Given the contentious nature of the issue, the district court acted
properly by relying heavily on the plain language of the statute, and the
weight of prior precedent, in making its decision.134 The district court
noted that it had concerns regarding whether its decision produced a
just result, but correctly pointed out that Congress possesses the power
to rectify the statutory language if it so chooses.135 Instead of heeding the
district court’s warning, the Sixth Circuit relied on the legislative history and legislative intent in thrusting itself into the middle of a policy
debate that is the province of the political branches.136 The Sixth Circuit’s
interpretation effectively amended the statutory language of the Privacy
Act by adding the civil remedies provision to the list of non-exemptible
provisions, presumably because it did not agree with the outcome that
would have resulted from the application of the plain statutory language.137 Yet, in a situation where a plain reading of the statute would
result in a similarly questionable outcome, the Supreme Court held that
the plain language of the Endangered Species Act must be followed—the
Court ordered the Tennessee Valley Authority to enjoin construction of a
dam that would have provided electricity to 20,000 households because
its operation would destroy the habitat of the snail darter, an endangered

See Agiesta & Benac, supra note 132 (noting that even poll which reported Americans chose
liberties over security found that majority of people surveyed also supported surveillance in public
areas, random searches, full-body scans and pat-downs of airline passengers, and warrantless
government analysis of financial transactions processed by United States banks).
134
See Shearson v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 06-1478, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16902, at *41–42
(N.D. Ohio Mar. 9, 2007), vacated, 638 F.3d 498 (6th Cir. 2011).
135
See id. at *38 (explaining that district court “recognizes the hardship that may befall law abiding
citizens who lack a mechanism to correct erroneous information. This Court, however, is charged
only with applying the laws Congress passes and lacks the authority to rewrite those laws.”).
136
See Shearson v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 638 F.3d 498, 502–05 (6th Cir. 2011) (describing
court’s focus on legislative intent); see also supra notes 111–12 (providing general discussion of
problems incumbent upon court’s consideration of legislative history and legislative intent when
statutory language is clear).
137
See Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(j) (1974) (listing subsections that are non-exemptible under
general exemptions provision); see also supra notes 108–22 and accompanying text (discussing how
Sixth Circuit overlooked seemingly plain and unambiguous exclusion of civil remedies provision
from list of non-exemptible provisions in order to hold that Shearson’s claims were not barred).
133
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species of fish.138 Therefore, although denying Shearson’s information
request may not be a desirable result from a policy standpoint, the purview of the judicial system is to apply the law, not to re-write it.
While the full and exact ramifications of the Sixth Circuit’s decision have yet to be felt, its impact on national security is inevitable.139
Government attorneys have resisted the release of information detailing methods by which citizens are identified, traced, and investigated
at border stops because certain agencies feel that terrorists could use
that information to discover how to circumvent attempts by the government and law enforcement agencies to target them in the future.140
In recognition of this concern, several federal courts have deemed the
exemptions under the Privacy Act as essential for national security so
long as the records are relevant and necessary to accomplish a legally
permissible purpose.141
The Sixth Circuit’s decision has prompted commentators to call
for congressional action to modernize the statute, or, alternatively,
for guidance from the Supreme Court to settle the circuit split.142 It is
unlikely that Congress ever envisioned terrorist watch lists, the expansive reach of the internet, or other major technological developments

The Endangered Species Act provides, in relevant part, that:
Federal departments and agencies shall . . . utilize their authorities in furtherance
of the purposes of this chapter by carrying out programs for the conservation
of endangered species . . . by taking such action necessary to insure that actions
authorized, funded, or carried out by them do not jeopardize the continued
existence of such endangered species . . . or result in the destruction or modification
of habitat of such species which is determined by the Secretary . . . to be critical.
Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (1976); see also Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S.
153, 173–74 (1978) (finding statutory provision and its requirements to be crystal clear, despite
seemingly ridiculous outcome of applying statutory language). The Tennessee Valley Authority
(“TVA”) argued that the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”) cannot be reasonably interpreted to
require shutting down a federally funded project that had been well under way before the ESA
was even enacted. See id. (noting that TVA’s argument must fail because its interpretation would
force Court to ignore ordinary meaning of plain language).
139
See infra notes 140–41 (discussing potential repercussions of Sixth Circuit’s ruling).
140
See Smith, supra note 2 (explaining government and agency fears that disclosure of this sensitive
information might compromise national security).
141
See Kerschberg, supra note 131 (discussing importance some federal courts placed on protecting
sensitive information with relevance to national security).
142
See id. (calling for guidance from Supreme Court or legislative amendments to Privacy Act).
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when it drafted the Privacy Act.143 The outdated language of the Privacy
Act, and the results that could arise from strict adherence to the statutory text, might explain why several courts have found the Privacy Act’s
language to be ambiguous and have instead focused on the Privacy
Act’s legislative history to reach what the court perceives to be a just outcome.144 Congress must lend finality through legislative action updating
the Privacy Act’s language and purpose to reflect current federal policies.145 Because Congress has the knowledge, resources, and expertise to
properly weigh the competing interests in an ever-changing world, it
remains the best vehicle for modernizing of the Privacy Act.146
See Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1974) (establishing 1974 as year in which Privacy Act was
drafted). Many Americans viewed the collapse of the World Trade Towers on September 11, 2001 as
the first real notice of the threat terrorism poses to the United States. See Nick J. Sciullo, The Ghost in the
Global War on Terror: Critical Perspectives and Dangerous Implications for National Security and the Law, 3
Drexel L. Rev. 561, 562 (2011) (describing terrorism as relatively new threat to America); see also Daniel
J. Mitchell, Fighting Terror and Defending Freedom: The Role of Cost-Benefit Analysis, 25 Pace L. Rev. 219,
219 (2005) (observing policy maker’s recognition after 9/11 that federal government needed better tools
to deter terrorist attacks in future); Igor Primoratz, A Philosopher Looks at Contemporary Terrorism, 29
Cardozo L. Rev. 33, 33 (2007) (noting that scale of attacks on 9/11 and large number of victims created
new public awareness for terrorism that had not existed prior to attacks); Updating the Privacy Act of
1974, Ctr. for Democracy and Tech. (June 5, 2009), http://www.cdt.org/policy/updating-privacyact-1974#4 (asserting that wording of Privacy Act from over thirty years ago “renders it ill-equipped
to meet many of the privacy challenges posed by modern information technology”). In fact, loopholes
were reported as early as 1977, and a report by the Privacy Protection Study Commission warned that
technological advancements threatened to outpace the Privacy Act. See id. (explaining that Privacy Act
was “designed to accommodate agency-held flat files, but computing has moved towards forms of
networked centralization and relational databases beyond the Privacy Act’s reach”).
144
Compare Shearson v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 06-1478, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16902, at *38
(N.D. Ohio Mar. 9, 2007) (realizing that outcome of Shearson’s case may not be just, but adhering to
statutory language as drafted by Congress), vacated, 638 F.3d 498 (6th Cir. 2011), with Shearson v. U.S.
Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 638 F.3d 498, 503–04 (6th Cir. 2011) (looking past plain language of Privacy Act
to interpret its legislative intent).
An analogy may be drawn between the effect that the emergence of terrorism has had on the
Privacy Act with the effect that continual technological advancements have had on the Copyright Act.
Section 106 of the Copyright Act gives the author of a copyrighted work the exclusive right to, among
other things, copy and distribute her work and to prepare derivative works. See Copyright Act, 17
U.S.C. § 106 (2002) (listing rights granted to authors of copyrighted work). The Copyright Act, however,
has largely been driven by changing technologies. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios,
Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 430 (1984) (“[L]aw of copyright has developed in response to significant changes
in technology.”). In Sony, the court was asked to decide whether Sony was liable as a contributory
infringer for selling VCRs that allowed users to record copyrighted broadcasts for viewing at a later
time. See id. at 420. The Supreme Court explained that, as new developments have occurred, Congress
has been the governmental entity that has fashioned the new rules necessitated by the evolving
technology. See id. at 430–31 (“[I]n a case like this, in which Congress has not plainly marked the course
to be followed by the judiciary, this Court must be circumspect in construing the scope of rights created
by a statute that never contemplated such a calculus of interests.”). According to the Court, Congress
possesses the constitutional authority and institutional ability to fully address competing interests
implicated by new technologies. See id. at 431 (recognizing Court’s reluctance to act without guidance
from Congress in applying outdated statutory language to unforeseen technologies).
145
See Kerschberg, supra note 131 (acknowledging Congress’s ability to settle debate and promote
uniformity on issue that has fractured circuit courts).
146
See Firehock, supra note 23, at 1545 n.6 (discussing privacy regulation in United States as area
left to Congress).
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